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Comment
Product Design and Post-Manufacture
Alteration: The Law of Subsequent
Modification in New York State
I. Introduction
Generally, a manufacturer must design its product so that it
can withstand both use in the manner for which it is intended
and use that, although unintended, is reasonably foreseeable.1
For example, a manufacturer of screwdrivers must, in some in-
stances, make sure that its product is not only safe for screwing
in screws, but also that it is safe for prying open the lid of a
can.2 A product has a defective design when it presents an un-
reasonable risk of harm to a person who uses the product as in-
tended or in a manner that is reasonably foreseeable. This is so,
despite the fact that the manufacturer may have made the prod-
uct with the utmost care and according to detailed plans and
specifications.4
1. Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 385-86, 348 N.E.2d 571, 577, 384 N.Y.S.2d
115, 121 (1975).
2. Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 480, 403 N.E.2d 440, 444, 426
N.Y.S.2d 717, 721 (1980).
3. The distinction between manufacturing defects and design defects should be con-
sidered. A manufacturing defect is a construction aberration that usually occurs in a
relatively small percentage of products of a given design. The defect occurs as a result of
an error in the manufacturing process. Therefore, a product with a manufacturing defect
does not conform in some significant aspect to the product's intended design. It also does
not conform to the great majority of products manufactured pursuant to that design.
Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 114, 128, 417 N.E.2d 545, 552, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251,
258 (1981). Conversely, a design defect is a flaw in a product's intended design. Injury
results to the user or others because the design itself was improper. Id. at 129, 417
N.E.2d at 553, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 258-59.
4. Robinson, 49 N.Y.2d at 479, 403 N.E.2d at 443, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 720. See also
1
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However, a manufacturer is not an insurer of its products,
and is not liable for every accident related to the use of its prod-
ucts. Difficult issues arise, therefore, in products liability litiga-
tion when a defendant-manufacturer is sued for injuries arising
out of the subsequent modification of its product design by the
user or a third party.'
In Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div.,6 the New York Court of
Appeals held that the issue of whether a manufacturer's product
design is defective is gauged at. the time the product leaves the
manufacturer's hands.7 The plaintiff, therefore, must show that
the product was defective when it left the defendant-manufac-
turer's possession and control.8 Consequently, a manufacturer is
not liable for injuries that arise when a party makes subsequent
modifications to its product, thereby changing its safely
designed product into a defective and unreasonably dangerous
one. In New York, if a product is subsequently modified the
defendant-manufacturer will not be held liable even if the modi-
fication was reasonably foreseeable.10
Part II of this Comment sets forth general background in-
formation regarding the concept of subsequent modification.
Part III analyzes what constitutes "subsequent modification" in
New York State." As will be shown, not all post-manufacture
alterations constitute subsequent modifications that preclude a
manufacturer from liability. If a fact-finder determines that a
product was not subsequently modified, the product, as changed,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
5. Michael B. Gallub, Limiting the Manufacturer's Duty for Subsequent Product
Alteration: Three Steps to a Rational Approach, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 361, 363 (1988).
6. 49 N.Y.2d 471, 403 N.E.2d 440, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1980).
7. Id. at 479, 403 N.E.2d at 443, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
8. Nelson v. Garcia, 129 Misc. 2d 909, 911, 494 N.Y.S.2d 276, 278 (Erie County
1985); see also Rainbow v. Albert Elia Bldg. Co., 79 A.D.2d 287, 293, 436 N.Y.S.2d 480,
484 (4th Dep't 1981), aff'd, 56 N.Y.2d 550, 434 N.E.2d 1345, 449 N.Y.S.2d 967 (1982); 1
N.Y. Pattern Jury Instructions - Civil, § 2:141.2 (2d ed. Cumin. Supp. 1991); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g (1965); M. STUART MADDEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 6.14 (2d ed. 1988).
9. Robinson, 49 N.Y.2d at 479, 403 N.E.2d at 443, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 720. Cf. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1)(b) (1965).
10. Robinson, 49 N.Y.2d at 481, 403 N.E.2d at 444, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
11. It is not within the scope of this Comment to address the issue of a manufac-
turer's potential liability for defective components that are supplied by another and in-
corporated into the product.
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is considered to be within the design chosen by the manufac-
turer. Therefore, a case not within Robinson's rationale is ana-
lyzed in terms of intended and reasonably foreseeable use. 2 Part
IV briefly discusses the concepts of intended and reasonably
foreseeable use, and the product misuse defense. Part V con-
cludes that the defenses of subsequent modification and product
misuse prevent defendant-manufacturers from being held liable
for product-related injuries that they do not cause.
II. Background
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(1)(b) states:
One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if [the product] is expected to and
does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in
the condition in which it is sold.13
Therefore, when the user of an altered product sustains injuries,
the issue of a manufacturer's liability raises the question of
whether the injuries were proximately caused by a design defect
in the product as manufactured and sold, or by a defect created
by an alteration made by the user or some other party.
To be successful, the plaintiff must prove that the product
was defective or dangerous while in the defendant-manufac-
turer's possession or otherwise in its control. 4 A defendant-man-
ufacturer will, of course, attempt to establish that the product
was altered after leaving its hands.15 If the defendant-manufac-
turer establishes that its product was subsequently altered, the
burden of proof shifts back to the plaintiff, who will attempt to
show that the alteration was not substantial,6 or that the prod-
12. See Gallub, supra note 5, at 401-07, for a discussion on the distinction between
product alteration and product misuse.
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1)(b) (1965). Significantly, the authors
of the Restatement did not take a position regarding the seller's liability when a product
was "expected to be processed or otherwise substantially changed" before it reached the
user or consumer. Id. at caveat 2; see also id. at cmt. p.
14. See generally M. STUART MADDEN, PRODUCTS LiAanLITv § 6.15 (2d ed. 1988).
15. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIARmiTY § 43:14 (3d ed. 1987).
16. See, e.g., Sage v. Falrchild-Swearingen Corp., 70 N.Y.2d 579, 587, 517 N.E.2d
1304, 1308, 523 N.Y.S.2d 418, 422 (1987).
1993]
3
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:269
uct was purposefully designed to permit the alteration. 17
In applying Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(1)(b),
most jurisdictions, including New York, require that the product
be substantially or materially altered in order to relieve the de-
fendant-manufacturer of liability. 8 One New York court stated
that "any modification or alteration that affects a safety device
and is the proximate cause of the injury is a 'material' alteration
.... M', Other jurisdictions do not apply the Restatement's "sub-
stantial change" language and instead apply the law of
causation.2"
Courts generally use one of three basic rationales to hold a
manufacturer liable for product-related injuries when its prod-
uct was subsequently altered:
(1) the original defect, not the alteration, was the proximate cause
of the injury, i.e., that the alteration was not substantial or mate-
rial, or (2) that the alteration was not an intervening, superseding
cause of the injury .... or (3) that the manufacturer ... should
have anticipated the alteration and warned of its dangers.2"
17. See, e.g., Lopez v. Precision Papers, Inc., 67 N.Y.2d 871, 873, 492 N.E.2d 1214,
1215, 501 N.Y.S.2d 798, 799 (1986). See Hiller v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 671 P.2d 369,
372 (Ala. 1983) for a general explanation on the burden-shifting aspect of the subsequent
modification defense.
18. See, e.g., Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 475, 403 N.E.2d 440,
441, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717, 718 (1980); Marois v. Paper Converting Mach. Co., 539 A.2d 621,
624 (Me. 1988) (change in the manufacturer's product is not significant "unless the
change relates to the essential features and to the safety of the product") (emphasis
omitted); Martinez v. Clark Equip. Co., 382 So. 2d 878, 881 (Fla. 1980) (repairs to the
drive wheel and hydraulic system of a forklift were not substantial changes as they did
not affect the claimed defective condition of the forklift); Speyer, Inc. v. Humble Oil &
Ref. Co., 403 F.2d 766, 771-72 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1015 (1969) (gasoline
pump was substantially altered when a third party replaced the type of hose ordinarily
furnished with the pump with a hose that created unusual pressure dynamics when vio-
lently stretched).
19. Miller v. Anetsberger Bros., 124 A.D.2d 1057, 1059, 508 N.Y.S.2d 954, 956 (4th
Dep't 1986).
20. See, e.g., Messler v. Simmons Gun Specialties, 687 P.2d 121, 125 (Okla. 1984)
("The seller or manufacturer may not be held liable if an alteration is responsible for the
defect, and is the intervening and superseding cause as opposed to the concurrent cause
of the injuries."); Dennis v. Ford Motor Co., 471 F.2d 733 (3d Cir. 1973). The Dennis
court held that "Section 402A is inapplicable to changes made by a user after receiving a
product .... Id. at 735. The user of a Ford truck-tractor mounted a fifth wheel upon
the tractor for the purpose of attaching a trailer. Id. at 734. The court reasoned that a
question of proximate cause was presented, and defendant-manufacturer could not rely
on section 402A. Id. at 735.
21. M. STUART MADDEN, PRODucTs LiARUirry § 6.15 at 244 (2d ed. 1988) (citations
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss1/8
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Unlike New York, the majority of jurisdictions hold that
subsequent alterations in the injury-causing product do not re-
lieve the manufacturer of liability if the changes made by a user
or third party were reasonably foreseeable to the manufac-
turer.22 For instance, in Thompson v. Package Machine Co., 28
the California Court of Appeal held that a manufacturer could
not avoid liability as a matter of law even though its product
might have been altered by an intentional disabling of a safety
device.2
In Thompson, plaintiff received injuries while operating a
plastic molding machine.2 5 The injury-causing accident occurred
when plaintiff reached inside the machine to remove a piece of
molded plastic.2 Part of plaintiff's arm was amputated when the
machine prematurely closed. The safety mechanism that
should have been in place to prevent the machine from closing
was not in position.2 8
Plaintiff alleged that design defects rendered the machine
unreasonably dangerous and proximately caused her injury.2 e
Defendant-manufacturer argued that if the machine was danger-
omitted).
22. See, e.g., Toth v. Yoder Co., 749 F.2d 1190, 1197 (6th Cir. 1984) (defendant-
manufacturer held liable for injuries despite evidence establishing that the accident
would not have happened but for the subsequent alteration because it was reasonable for
the jury to find that the modification to the machine was foreseeable); Vanskike v. ACF
Indus., 665 F.2d 188, 195 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982) (defendant-
manufacturer held liable for injuries when evidence established that alterations in a
trailer hitch were foreseeable due to the defendant-manufacturer's original design); He-
lene Curtis Indus. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 856 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 913
(1968) (manufacturer of hair coloring not liable for plaintiff's injuries because it was not
foreseeable that the purchaser would mix its product with another brand); Smith v. Ho-
bart Mfg. Co., 302 F.2d 570, 574 (3d Cir. 1962) (defendant-manufacturer not liable for
injuries when it did not expect nor should have expected plaintiff to remove a safety
guard from a meat grinder).
Allowing the issue of foreseeability to enter into the determination of whether a
defendant-manufacturer should be liable for injuries associated with its subsequently
modified product has been criticized. See, e.g., Gallub, supra note 5; David J. McAllister,
Note, Product Modification: The Effect of Foreseeability, 42 U. Prrr. L. REV. 431 (1981).
23. 99 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1971).
24. Id. at 284.
25. Id. at 283.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
1993]
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ous, it became so only because it had been modified after it had
left the factory.30
The court refused to absolve defendant-manufacturer from
liability as a matter of law, emphasizing that "a manufacturer
may be held liable where the alteration of the machine ... was
reasonably foreseeable."3 The court concluded that the issue of
foreseeability is a fact to be decided by the jury.32
Likewise, in Soler v. Castmaster, Division,3 the New Jersey
Supreme Court stated that "[w]hen it is foreseeable that a sub-
stantial change [in a product] will create a risk of injury, the
manufacturer can be liable under strict liability principles for
injuries proximately caused by such change. ' 34 Significantly, the
New Jersey court predicated this liability on the determination
that the manufacturer could have prevented the alteration from
taking place."
In Soler, plaintiff's hand was injured by moving parts of a
die-casting machine manufactured by defendant.36 Defendant-
manufacturer had originally designed the machine so that each
of its two cycles required manual starting.37 The machine was
not designed or manufactured with a safety gate or any other
device to prevent a worker's hand or fingers from touching the
machine's moving parts while it was in motion or capable of be-
ing set in motion.38
After the machine left defendant-manufacturer's control,
plaintiff's employer altered the normal mode for the manual
starting cycles by adding a trip wire that automatically started
both cycles once the machine was activated. 9 The employer also
added a safety gate designed to shut off the machine's power
when the gate was in the open position.40
Plaintiff was injured when he attempted to dislodge a fin-
30. Id.
31. Id. at 286.
32. Id.
33. 484 A.2d 1225 (N.J. 1984).
34. Id. at 1232.
35. Id. "
36. Id. at 1227.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1228.
40. Id.
[Vol. 13:269
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ished product from the mold.41 Plaintiff testified that although
the machine stopped when he opened the safety gate, it started
again once he removed the plastic product from the mold.42 Con-
sequently, his hand was caught between the two moving parts of
the mold."3
Evidence established that defendant-manufacturer's origi-
nal design rendered the machine dangerous. 44 Safety devices
that were available at the time the die-casting machine was
manufactured were not used by defendant-manufacturer.45 Al-
though the court acknowledged that the machine had been al-
tered after it left the defendant-manufacturer's control, the
court refused to "exonerate or absolve the manufacturer from
responsibility for a design defect that foreseeably contributed to
the ultimate accident.' 46
In New York, however, the fact that a subsequent modifica-
tion was foreseeable to the manufacturer does not bear on the
issue of the manufacturer's liability for a plaintiff's injuries.' 7 In
rejecting the foreseeability standard, New York's highest court
stated that to hold otherwise "would expand the scope of a man-
ufacturer's duty beyond all reasonable bounds and would be tan-
tamount to imposing absolute liability on manufacturers for all
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1233.
47. Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 480, 403 N.E.2d 440, 443, 426
N.Y.S.2d 717, 721 (1980). Cases in other jurisdictions where foreseeability did not create
liability for the defendant-manufacturer include: Hines v. Joy Mfg. Co., 850 F.2d 1146,
1151 (6th Cir. 1988) (court declined to apply elements of foreseeability to a state statute
which limited a manufacturer's liability for alterations or modifications to its products);
Kubza v. General Motors Corp., 580 N.E.2d 47, 49 (Ohio 1989) ("Substantial change is
defined as any change which increases the likelihood of a malfunction, which is the prox-
imate cause of the harm complained of, and which is independent of the expected and
intended use to which the product is put.") (emphasis omitted); Gomez v. Clark Equip.
Co., 743 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Mo. 1987) ("[I]f a modification is foreseeable, but the modifi-
cation makes a safe product unsafe, the manufacturer is not liable."); Talley v. City
Tank Corp., 279 S.E.2d 264, 269 (Ga. 1981) (No issue of defective design is present where
"the evidence is uncontroverted that the original design of the manufacturer's product
has been totally eliminated and replaced so that the only similarity between the old and
the new is the mere basic function to be performed .... ")
1993]
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product-related injuries. ' '48
III. The Law of Subsequent Modification in New York State
A. Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Division
New York's standard for determining whether a manufac-
turer is liable for its subsequently altered products was enunci-
ated in Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Division.9 In Robinson, the
New York Court of Appeals held that a manufacturer of a prod-
uct will not be held liable for a plaintiff's injuries "where, after
the product leaves the possession and control of the manufac-
turer, there is a subsequent modification which substantially al-
ters the product and is the proximate cause of plaintiff's inju-
ries." 50  Furthermore, the court stated that principles of
foreseeability are not applicable "where a third party affirma-
tively abuses a product by consciously bypassing built-in safety
features. '51
Plaintiff Gerald Robinson was employed as a plastic mold-
ing machine operator by Plastic Jewel Parts Company ("Plastic
Jewel"). 52 Plastic Jewel bought a plastic molding machine manu-
factured by defendant Reed-Prentice. By design, Reed-Prentice
equipped the machine with a safety gate which made human
contact with the movable, dangerous parts of the machine im-
possible .5  However, the safety gate was an impediment to the
manufacture of Plastic Jewel's bead products in that it pre-
cluded manipulation of the beads while they were in the ma-
chine.54 Since the machine's design did not comport with its pro-
duction requirements, Plastic Jewel employees cut a hole
through the safety gate.55 Although this modification eased pro-
duction, it simultaneously eliminated the safety device incorpo-
rated into the machine's design. 6 Consequently, plaintiff's hand
48. Robinson, 49 N.Y.2d at 478, 403 N.E.2d at 444, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
49. 49 N.Y.2d 471, 403 N.E.2d 440, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1980).
50. Id. at 475, 403 N.E.2d at 441, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
51. Id. at 480, 403 N.E.2d at 443, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
52. Id. at 475, 403 N.E.2d at 441, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
53. Id. at 476, 403 N.E.2d at 441, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
54. Id. at 477, 403 N.E.2d at 442, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
55. Id.
56. Id.
[Vol. 13:269
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went through the opening while the machine was operating. As
the machine completed its molding cycle, plaintiff sustained se-
rious injury.
Evidence established that Reed-Prentice knew, or should
have known, that the safety gate designed for the machine made
it impossible for Plastic Jewel to properly manufacture its prod-
uct.59 Reed-Prentice representatives saw identical machines at
Plastic Jewel's plant with holes cut in the safety gates.60 Fur-
thermore, Plastic Jewel's plant manager discussed the problem
of the safety gate with Reed-Prentice representatives, and asked
whether a more suitable safety gate could be designed. 1 A letter
sent by Reed-Prentice to Plastic Jewel established that Reed-
Prentice "knew precisely what its customer was doing to the
safety gate and refused to modify its design." 2 Further evidence
established that Reed-Prentice could have made modifications
to the safety gate to accommodate Prentice Jewel without ren-
dering the machine unreasonably dangerous.6 3
Plaintiff sought to impose liability on Reed-Prentice be-
cause Plastic Jewel's act of destroying the functional utility of
the safety gate was foreseeable." Plaintiff asserted that "if a
manufacturer knows or has reason to know that its product
would be used in an unreasonably dangerous manner, for exam-
ple by cutting a hole in a legally required safety guard, it may
not evade responsibility by simply maintaining that the product
was safe at the time of sale."'65
However, the court disagreed with plaintiff's arguments."
In finding that the machine was not defective when delivered to
Plastic Jewel, the court reasoned that foreseeability was not at
issue because the safety features were intentionally modified by
the purchaser, not the manufacturer. 7 The court distinguished
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 477-78, 403 N.E.2d at 442, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
62. Id. at 478, 403 N.E.2d at 442, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 478, 403 N.E.2d at 442, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 479-80, 403 N.E.2d at 443-44, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 720-21.
67. Id.
1993]
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the instant case from cases in which the manufacturer knew that
its product would be used safely and reasonably for purposes
other than those for which it was specifically designed. 8
To illustrate this point, the Court of Appeals noted that if a
screwdriver manufacturer foresaw that its screwdriver might be
used to pry open the lid of a can, it would have a corresponding
duty to design the shank of the screwdriver with enough
strength to accomplish that task. 9 Because a manufacturer can
anticipate the reasonable use to which its product may be put, it
is under a duty to prevent injury to those who choose to use its
product in such an unintended, yet reasonably foreseeable way. 0
In such cases, the product is not changed by the consumer, and
the manufacturer can foresee the unintended use and the poten-
tial for resulting injury if the product cannot withstand such a
foreseeable, unintended use. 71
However, the court reasoned, a manufacturer is not obli-
gated to design an abuse-proof product nor one that contains
safety features impossible to circumvent."3 Nor does a manufac-
turer have a duty to guarantee that its products will withstand
careless or reckless treatment, nor insure that users will not
change the product to fit their individual needs. 73 Therefore,
when a manufacturer furnishes a product that is safe at the time
of sale, material alterations that create a defect do not establish
liability in the manufacturer, no matter how foreseeable such
modification may have been.74
To avoid liability for its subsequently altered product, a lit-
eral reading of Robinson requires that a manufacturer show 1)
an affirmative modification or substantial alteration of 2) a
safety device of 3) a product that was reasonably safe when it
left the manufacturer's hands, and that 4) the modification or
alteration was the proximate cause of the accident.75 New York
68. Id. at 480, 403 N.E.2d at 444, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
69. Id.
70. See infra Part IV, for a discussion on intended use and foreseeable use.
71. Robinson, 49 N.Y.2d at 480, 403 N.E.2d at 444, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
72. Id. at 480-81, 403 N.E.2d at 444, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Michael Weinberger, Product Misuse in New York State, 53 N.Y. ST. B.J.
363, 366 (1981).
[Vol. 13:269
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courts have expanded the Robinson rationale to include parts
other than safety devices.76 However, as will be demonstrated,
not all post-manufacture alterations are deemed "subsequent
modifications" under Robinson.
B. The Application of Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Division
1. Defining Subsequent Modification
Products may be changed in various ways subsequent to
manufacture." For instance, safety devices may be disengaged,
parts substituted or altered, or the product may be installed im-
properly. However, not every change that occurs in a product's
design is considered a subsequent modification within the mean-
ing of Robinson.78
Six years after Robinson, the New York Court of Appeals
declined to hold that all disablements of safety devices consti-
tute subsequent modifications. Lopez v. Precision Papers, Inc.79
affirmed the Appellate Division's holding that a subsequent
modification does not occur as a matter of law where safeguards
can be easily removed, and where such removal thereby in-
creases the efficacy of the product. The court reasoned that a
question of fact exists as to a product's intended design when
changes to the product are readily accomplished and the prod-
uct is thereby made more functional.8 0 Therefore, a manufac-
turer may be liable under a theory of design defect even though
the removal of a safety feature proximately caused the injury.81
In order to hold a defendant-manufacturer liable for injuries
under Lopez, a plaintiff must prove that the product "was pur-
76. See infra notes 109-34 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT § 112 (D)(1) (1979). Altera-
tion or modification of a product "occurs when a person or entity other than the product
seller changes the design, construction, or formula of the product ...." Id. This Act
specifically provides that if the product was altered in accord with the product seller's
instructions or with the express or implied consent of the product seller then the product
can not be considered subsequently modified. Id. § 112 (D)(2)(a) - (b).
78. McGavin v. Herrick & Cowell Co., 118 A.D.2d 982, 982-83, 500 N.Y.S.2d 85, 86
(3d Dep't 1986).
79. 67 N.Y.2d 871, 492 N.E.2d 1214, 501 N.Y.S.2d 798 (1986).
80. 107 A.D.2d 667, 669, 484 N.Y.S.2d 585, 587 (2d Dep't 1985), afl'd, 67 N.Y.2d
871, 492 N.E.2d 1214, 501 N.Y.S.2d 798 (1986).
81. Id.
1993]
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posefully manufactured to permit its use without the safety
guard."8
Plaintiff Pablo Lopez, a forklift operator at Mutual Paper
Company ("Mutual Paper"), was severely injured when a large
roll of paper fell from a wooden pallet on a forklift machine he
was operating, and struck him on the head. Plaintiff sued the
forklift manufacturer, Clark Equipment Company ("Clark
Equipment"), alleging certain design defects, the most relevant
being an easily removable overhead guard. 3 Clark Equipment,
relying on Robinson, sought to dismiss the complaint because
Mutual Paper directed its employees to remove the overhead
guard on the forklift."'
The appellate division distinguished Robinson when it de-
nied defendant-manufacturer's motion to dismiss the complaint.
The court stated that in Robinson "the modification was so sub-
stantial that it permanently destroyed the functional utility of a
safety gate."'85 In Lopez, the court contrasted, the safety device
was easily removed and the removal made the product more
functional.86 Therefore, the court reasoned that removing the
safety device was not a subsequent modification as a matter of
law under Robinson.8 7 Consequently, the court held that the jury
should decide whether the safety guard was designed to be used
with the forklift."
The dissent in the appellate division challenged the major-
ity's interpretation of Robinson. Applying Robinson's holding to
the instant facts, the dissent noted that the removal of the
safety guard was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries, and
that Mutual Paper, not Clark Equipment, purposefully removed
the safety guard.89 Noting that Robinson held that a manufac-
turer is not required to install backup safety devices in its prod-
uct even though it is foreseeable that a user may disable the ex-
isting safety device, the dissent argued that Robinson absolutely
82. Lopez, 67 N.Y.2d at 873, 492 N.E.2d at 1215, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
83. Lopez, 107 A.D.2d at 667-68, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 586-87.
84. Id. at 668, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 587.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 669-70, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 588 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 13:269
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barred Lopez's claim against Clark Equipment. Furthermore,
the dissent explained, Robinson held that a manufacturer is not
required to design " 'a product that is impossible to abuse or one
whose safety features may not be circumvented.' "90
The dissent in Lopez has the better argument. The manu-
facturer's inability to control its product once it is sold is the
raison d'9tre of Robinson.e1 By merely highlighting the easy re-
moval of the safety guard and the subsequent greater versatility
of the forklift, the Lopez court disregarded the fact that the
product left the factory with the safety guard attached. The Lo-
pez court, therefore, sidestepped Robinson by attaching little
significance to the state of the product when it left the manufac-
turer's control.
Where a product is altered by the removal of a safety de-
vice, a court should extend its examination of the product's de-
sign to include more factors than Lopez requires. Since the
safety device is usually the crucial element that prevents a prod-
uct from becoming unreasonably dangerous, a more detailed
analysis is logical.
Whether a safety device was designed to be used with a
product should be further analyzed by examining how effective
the safety device would have been had it been in place and how
adequate the warnings and instructions were with regard to the
removal of the safety device. These additional factors better in-
dicate whether the disabling of a safety device constitutes a sub-
sequent modification.
First, if a safety device is not effective when it is in place,
then the product is unreasonably dangerous at the time of man-
ufacture. Removing the safety device, therefore, is not a subse-
quent modification because the product was never safely
designed.2 Conversely, proof that the safety device was effective
when in place, and that the product left the manufacturer in
such a condition, should influence a fact-finder to reason that
the safety device was purposefully designed to be used with the
90. Id. at 673, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 590 (Rubin, J., dissenting) (quoting Robinson, 49
N.Y.2d at 480-81, 403 N.E.2d at 444, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 721).
91. Robinson, 49 N.Y.2d at 479-80, 403 N.E.2d at 443-44, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 720-21.
92. See McGavin v. Herrick & Cowell, 118 A.D.2d 982, 983, 500 N.Y.S.2d 85, 87 (3d
Dep't 1986).
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product.
Second, a manufacturer that adequately warns or instructs
users not to remove a safety device should not be held liable for
resulting injuries if such admonitions are subsequently disre-
garded.93 Since a manufacturer's post-sale control of its product
is severely limited, proof that the manufacturer properly advised
users as to the proper use of a safety device should be given em-
phasis by a fact-finder in determining how the product was
designed.
Nevertheless, when a safety device has been disabled, New
York courts use the Lopez gloss to determine whether the safety
device was part of the product's design. For example, LaPaglia
v. Sears Roebuck & Co.94 involved a lawn mower sold with an
easily removable chute deflector and with a detachable grass
catcher that had a shorter serviceable life than the lawn mower.
The Second Department held that the use of the machine with-
out either attachment did not constitute a subsequent modifica-
tion as a matter of law. 5
Relying on Lopez, the appellate court found that the lawn
mower was designed and manufactured to allow the easy re-
moval of the chute deflector in order to install the grass
catcher. 6 Furthermore, the court found that defendant-manu-
facturer failed to provide a "cautionary instruction as to the
consequences of operating the mower without either the chute
deflector or the grass bag ..... "9 Therefore, the court denied
defendant-manufacturer's motion to vacate a verdict against it
because the jury could properly find that the manufacturer
93. See Van Buskirk v. Migliorelli, 185 A.D.2d 587, 588-89, 586 N.Y.S.2d 378, 379-80
(3d Dep't 1992); UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY AcT OF 1991, H.R. 2700, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1991) § 4 (a)(1) (Version 2, March 10, 1992) (precludes manufacturer's liability for
alterations of a product "which the manufacturer specifically prohibited, warned, or in-
structed against").
An analysis of what constitutes an adequate warning or instruction is not within the
scope of this Comment.
94. 143 A.D.2d 173, 531 N.Y.S.2d 623 (2d Dep't 1988).
95. Id. at 177, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 627. See also McAvoy v. Outboard Marine Corp., 134
A.D.2d 245, 520 N.Y.S.2d 586 (2d Dep't 1987) (jury could properly find that a lawn
mower was designed to be used without a protective plate where the plate was easily
removed and the lawn mower made more versatile).
96. LaPaglia, 143 A.D.2d at 177, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 627.
97. Id.
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designed the mower to be used without either attachment.9 8
After Lopez, a defendant-manufacturer must prove that its
product was purposefully designed to include the use of the ex-
isting safety devices. In Lovelace v. Ametek, Inc.,9e defendant-
manufacturer was not liable when plaintiff received injuries
from a water extracting machine that his employer had modified
by removing three safety devices. 100 In dismissing plaintiff's
claim against defendant-manufacturer, the court noted that dis-
abling at least one of the safety devices "was not an easy
feat."'10 1 Likewise, in Darsan v. Guncalito Corp.,102 defendant-
manufacturer of a meat grinder was not liable for plaintiff's inju-
ries when a third party removed the safety devices that were
originally attached to the grinder.103 Although the guard was re-
movable, the court noted that it was not easily removable, and,
therefore, the court reasoned that the meat grinder was not pur-
posefully manufactured to permit its use without the safety
guard.104
In Magee v. E.W. Bliss,1°0 the Fourth Department did not
consider Lopez in granting summary judgment to the defendant-
manufacturer of a punch press. The court found that the origi-
nally designed activation system that required forty pounds of
vertical downward pressure had been replaced by a dual set of
pneumatic controls.108 An important safety feature of the press
was thereby destroyed. 10 7 The court applied Robinson to deter-
mine that the machine was subsequently modified as a matter of
law, and therefore, the manufacturer could not be held liable. 08
98. Id. See also O'Bara v. Piekos, 161 A.D.2d 1118, 555 N.Y.S.2d 939 (4th Dep't
1990) (a jury should decide whether a chain saw was "purposefully manufactured and
assembled to permit its use without a chain brake").
99. 111 A.D.2d 953, 490 N.Y.S.2d 49 (3d Dep't 1985).
100. Id. at 954-55, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 51.
101. Id. at 954, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 51.
102. 153 A.D.2d 868, 545 N.Y.S.2d 594 (2d Dep't 1989).
103. Id. at 870, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 596.
104. Id. See also Van Buskirk v. Migliorelli, 185 A.D.2d 587, 588-89, 586 N.Y.S.2d
378, 379-80 (3d Dep't 1992) (defendant-manufacturer not liable when evidence estab-
lished that a safety guard was not intended to be removable, and, in fact, could not be
removed without the proper tools).
105. 120 A.D.2d 926, 502 N.Y.S.2d 886 (4th Dep't 1986).
106. Id. at 926, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
107. Id. at 927, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 888.
108. Id. See also Kingsland v. Industrial Brown Hoist Co., 136 A.D.2d 901, 524
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A subsequent modification that precludes a defendant-man-
ufacturer from liability is not limited to the disabling of safety
devices. 10 9 For example, a product may be subsequently modi-
fied when replacement parts are substituted for original parts. In
Hansen v. Honda Motor Co.,110 the defendant-manufacturer of a
motorcycle was not liable for injuries when plaintiff customized
his motorcycle by removing the stock rear wheel and replacing it
with a wheel manufactured by another company.' The court
considered this replacement a subsequent modification and held
that defendant-manufacturer was not liable for the resulting in-
juries." 2 Furthermore, the court reasoned that the manufacturer
had no duty to warn "of the dangers attendant upon alteration
or modification of the motorcycle." s
However, not all replacements of original parts constitute
subsequent modifications. In Sage v. Fairchild-Swearingen
Corp.,"4 the Court of Appeals held that when the overall design
of a product is not substantially altered by a replacement part,
the defendant-manufacturer cannot avoid liability under a the-
ory of subsequent modification."6 It is important to note that
N.Y.S.2d 929 (4th Dep't 1988). The Kingsland court did not discuss Lopez in its deter-
mination that a bridge was subsequently modified by the removal of a fail-safe pawl and
ratchet mechanism. These apparatuses were designed to prevent the uncontrolled drop-
ping of the apron of the bridge. Apparently the bridge was not made more functional by
the removal of these devices.
109. But see McGavin v. Herrick & Cowell, 118 A.D.2d 982, 983, 500 N.Y.S.2d 85, 86
(3d Dep't 1986). In denying summary judgment to a defendant-manufacturer the court
therein noted that the subsequent modification involved a part of the product "that de-
fendant did not consider ... to be an integral safety feature of its machine, the removal
of which would render the product unsafe."
110. 104 A.D.2d 850, 480 N.Y.S.2d 244 (2d Dep't 1984).
111. Id. at 851, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 245-46.
112. Id.
113. Id., 480 N.Y.S.2d at 246.
114. 70 N.Y.2d 579, 517 N.E.2d 1304, 523 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1987).
115. Id. at 587, 517 N.E.2d at 1308, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 422. See also Kneuer v. Ameri-
can Hoist & Derrick Co., 126 A.D.2d 608, 511 N.Y.S.2d 46 (2d Dep't 1987). In Kneuer,
plaintiff was injured while testing a quarter-turn ball valve manufactured by Elkhart on
a fire hydrant manufactured by American Hoist. During this test, the water pressure
built up, and caused the hydrant to lift off the ground. The hydrant landed on plaintiff's
foot, causing injuries. Although the valve was not manufactured by American Hoist, the
court held that substituting the valve did not constitute a subsequent modification as a
matter of law, without regard to the defendant-manufacturer's expectation of the user
replacing the part.
This principle has been codified in Illinois. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss1/8
SUBSEQUENT MODIFICATION
although a replacement part was involved in plaintiffs injury,
defendant-manufacturer was found liable because the third
party's replacement of the manufacturer's original part did not
alter the manufacturer's product design.116
Plaintiff Joan Sage, a station agent with Commuter Airlines,
unloaded passenger baggage from an airplane's cargo compart-
ment after a Commuter aircraft had just landed. Upon complet-
ing her work, plaintiff attempted to deplane by sitting on the sill
of the cargo doorway, grasping the door frame, and jumping. As
she jumped off, however, the third finger of her left hand caught
on a ladder hanger placed on the door frame. 1 7 The hanger, a
"v" shaped device, was used to support one end of a portable
ladder, and was located near the opening of the cargo compart-
ment. She was suspended in air by her finger, which was wedged
in the hanger. The injury was so severe that the finger later had
to be amputated."'
At trial, the jury found that the hanger was not made by
defendant-manufacturer Fairchild-Swearingen, but was a re-
placement part made and installed by Commuter Airlines.""
The replacement part was attached to the doorway of the cargo
compartment in the same location and in the same manner as
the original part. 20 Furthermore, defendant admitted that it did
not expect purchasers to buy a new hanger once it broke because
replacement parts could be easily made by the purchaser.' 2 '
The Court of Appeals did not find the fact that a replace-
ment part caused the injury dispositive on the issue of the man-
ufacturer's liability. 2 2 The court distinguished Robinson and
Hansen, noting that in those cases "the purchaser changed not
only the part but also the design of the part and injury resulted
because of the change." 23 In Sage, the Court of Appeals ex-
213(e) (Smith-Hurd 1983) (replacement of a product part with a substitute that is the
same as the original is not considered an alteration).
116. Sage, 70 N.Y.2d at 586-87, 517 N.E.2d at 1308, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 422; see also
Gallub, supra note 5, at 467.
117. Sage, 70 N.Y.2d at 583, 517 N.E.2d at 1305, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
118. Id. at 582, 517 N.E.2d at 1305, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
119. Id. at 585, 517 N.E.2d at 1306-07, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 420-21.
120. Id. at 584, 517 N.E.2d at 1306, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 587, 517 N.E.2d at 1308, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
123. Id. at 586, 517 N.E.2d at 1307-08, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 421-22.
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plained, although the hanger was a replacement part, "the
hanger design was not altered and it was the manufacturer's de-
fective design - both of the hanger and of the compartment
doorway - which caused the injury. "124
The court reasoned that "in fabricating and installing a new
part Commuter's employees . . . did no more than perpetuate
defendant's bad design as defendant's representatives foresaw
they might. '1 5 The court further reasoned that the manufac-
turer should bear the cost of plaintiff's injury because it
designed a defective product and it knew, that upon its break-
age, the purchaser was likely to rely on the original design in
copying and replacing the product.126 Insulating the defendant-
manufacturer under these circumstances, the court stated, would
allow a manufacturer "to escape liability for designing flimsy
parts secure in the knowledge that once the part breaks and is
replaced, it will no longer be liable.' 7
The issue of a manufacturer's anticipation of subsequent re-
pair was addressed in Kehn v. Cooley Volkswagen Corp.2 8 In
Kehn, a driver's side car seat was subsequently altered by a
prior car accident and subsequent negligent repair.2 9 Plaintiff
was injured when his car seat suddenly and unexpectedly tipped
backwards, causing him to lose control of his vehicle. 30 The
court held that defendant-manufacturer could not be liable as a
matter of law because it had no reason to foresee "any likelihood
that its product would have been negligently repaired in the
manner which occurred herein."' 3'
A product may be subsequently modified when its existing
parts are altered instead of substituted. For instance, in Bing-
ham v. Godfrey, 3 2 defendant-manufacturer was not liable for
plaintiff's injuries caused by the subsequent electrical rewiring
of a vacuum cleaner. A third party attempted to change a three-
124. Id. at 586-87, 517 N.E.2d at 1308, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
125. Id. at 587, 517 N.E.2d at 1308, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 94 A.D.2d 876, 463 N.Y.S.2d 570 (3d Dep't 1983).
129. Id. at 876-77, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 571.
130. Id. at 876, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 571.
131. Id. at 877, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 571-72.
132. 114 A.D.2d 987, 495 N.Y.S.2d 428 (2d Dep't 1985).
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pronged grounded plug into a two-pronged standard plug, and
wrapped the grounding and hot wires together. 8 Because plain-
tiff could not prove that this design defect existed at the time of
manufacture, defendant-manufacturer was not liable for the en-
suing injuries. " 4
Recently, the New York Court of Appeals held in Amatulli
v. Delhi Construction Corp.135 that a product may be subse-
quently modified even though the product itself was not physi-
cally altered. In Amatulli, the court held that installing an
above-ground pool in the ground, and surrounding it with a
deck, constituted a subsequent modification under Robinson.3 6
Plaintiff Vincent Amatulli, Jr. dove headfirst into a four
foot deep swimming pool. Although the pool was designed, man-
ufactured and marketed for installation above ground, the own-
ers installed it two feet below ground, and built a deck around
it.18 Consequently, the pool gave the appearance of a deep in-
ground pool.3 8
Plaintiff argued that the pool was defectively designed be-
cause it gave the appearance of a greater depth of water than
actually existed. 3 9 Plaintiff further stated that the pool's manu-
facturer, Seaspray Sharkline ("Seaspray"), knew or should have
known that it was common practice for consumers to install
above-ground pools in the ground.14 0 Plaintiff contended that in-
stalling the pool in-ground was not a material alteration within
the meaning of Robinson.14 1
Rejecting plaintiff's arguments, New York's highest court
found that when Seaspray manufactured the pool, it was safe for
its intended use as an above-ground recreational swimming
pool. 42 The court observed that, had the pool been properly in-
stalled as an above-ground pool, plaintiff would have readily ob-
1.33. Id. at 988, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 429.
134. Id.
135. 77 N.Y.2d 525, 571 N.E.2d 645, 569 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1991).
136. Id. at 533, 571 N.E.2d at 649, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 340.
137. Id. at 529, 571 N.E.2d at 647, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 339.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 531, 571 N.E.2d at 647, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 339.
140. Id. at 533, 571 N.E.2d at 649, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 341.
141. Id. at 531, 571 N.E.2d at 648, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 340.
142. Id. at 532, 571 N.E.2d at 648, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 340.
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served its shallowness. 14 8 Therefore, the Court of Appeals rea-
soned, installing the pool in-ground, and surrounding it with a
deck, "transformed its configuration" and constituted a subse-
quent modification.144 Furthermore, it was this modification,
which was not attributable to the manufacturer or the pool's de-
sign, that caused the dangerous condition."1" Since the manner
in which the pool had been installed constituted a modification
under Robinson, the fact that Seaspray knew or should have
known of the alleged practice of consumers installing above-
ground pools in the ground was inapposite.1 46
The Amatulli court, therefore, equated the in-ground instal-
lation of the pool with the disabling of a safety device. To illus-
trate, visualize a pool sitting above ground. The physical appear-
ance of a plastic tub with walls only four feet high operates as a
safety device because it cautions a swimmer not to dive. How-
ever, when a consumer installs a pool below the ground and con-
structs a deck around its periphery, the appearance of a shallow
pool is eliminated. Therefore, conceptually, the safety device is
removed and nothing discourages a person from diving into the
shallow water. Unless Amatulli is viewed in this manner, Robin-
son would be inapplicable because no physical alteration was
made to the product after it left defendant-manufacturer's
factory.1 47
143. Id. at 533, 571 N.E.2d at 649, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 341.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. The dissent strongly challenged the majority's decision to apply Robinson to a
situation that did not involve physical alteration. Amatulli, 77 N.Y.2d at 537-39, 571
N.E.2d at 652-53, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 344-45 (Titone, J., dissenting). Amatulli did not em-
brace the rationale used in Green v. Kautex Machs., Inc., 159 A.D.2d 945, 552 N.Y.S.2d
794 (4th Dep't 1990). In Green, a plastic blow-molding machine was designed with safety
guards on its sides that measured fifty-four inches from ground level. The top of the
machine had no guard. In order to enable workers to reach into the top of the machine
into the die head and gripper area, the plaintiff's employer placed a platform adjacent to
the machine. In denying defendant-manufacturer's motion for summary judgment, the
court relied on the fact that the machine itself was not modified or altered. Id. at 946,
552 N.Y.S.2d at 795.
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2. Determining Proximate Cause
Demonstrating that the product was subsequently modified
is only the first hurdle for a detendant-manufacturer in a design
defect action. Next, it must demonstrate that the subsequent
modification was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, or
that the product's design did not cause the injury. Proximate
cause serves a different role in strict products liability cases than
in ordinary negligence actions.148 In strict products liability ac-
tions alleging design defects, proximate cause means that the de-
fect was the "substantial factor in causing plaintiff's injury. 14 9
Proximate cause, therefore, does not relate to the causal rela-
tionship between the manufacturer's alleged negligence in mak-
ing the product and the plaintiff's subsequent injury. Instead, it
refers to the causal relationship between the alleged product de-
fect and the injury.150
To avoid liability in subsequent modification cases a de-
fendant manufacturer must prove that the subsequent modifica-
tion proximately caused the injury. In Garcia v. Biro Manufac-
turing Co.,' 5' plaintiff's right hand was severed when it was
pulled into a meat grinder. A third party had modified the meat
grinder by cutting off the bolts which had previously held a
safety guard over the feeding mechanism. 52 As modified, the
guard could be swiveled out of the way.15 3 Since plaintiff's hand
would not have been injured if the safety guard was in place the
court found that the subsequent modification was the proximate
cause of plaintiff's injury.15 4 Therefore, defendant-manufacturer
was not held liable for plaintiff's injuries.155
148. Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 102, 110, 450 N.E.2d 204, 209, 463
N.Y.S.2d 398, 403 (1983); Nutting v. Ford Motor Co., 180 A.D.2d 122, 131, 584 N.Y.S.2d
653, 658 (3d Dep't 1992).
149. Voss, 59 N.Y.2d at 109-10, 450 N.E.2d at 209-10, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 403.
150. Id. at 110, 450 N.E.2d at 209, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 403.
151. 101 A.D.2d 779, 475 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1st Dep't), rev'd on other grounds, 63
N.Y.2d 751, 469 N.E.2d 834, 480 N.Y.S.2d 316 (1984).
152. 101 A.D.2d at 779, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 864.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 780, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 865. See also Baran v. Curtiss Wright Corp., 115
A.D.2d 252, 495 N.Y.S.2d 854 (4th Dep't 1985) (plaintiff removed shell guards from table
saw and was injured when her hand came into contact with the blade of the saw).
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Likewise, in Clifford v. Black Clawson Co.,1 56 plaintiffs
hand and arm were injured by the moving parts of a duplex
rewinder, a machine used in the manufacture of paper. A third
party modified the machine when it detached safety guards that
would have prevented plaintiff from coming into contact with
the moving parts.15 7 The defendant-manufacturer was not liable
for the resulting injury because, among other reasons, the failure
to use the guard proximately caused the injury.1 58
Similarly, in Frey v. Rockford Safety Equip. Co.,159 plaintiff
was injured as a direct result of her employer's installation of a
switch that allowed a punch press to be operated without its
safety device.160 Had it not been for this modification, plaintiff
would not have received her injuries.1 61 Therefore, the court held
that defendant-manufacturer was not liable for the resulting
injuries.162
However, it is not enough that the modified part was in-
volved in the injury. The modification must render an otherwise
safe product defective. 63 Therefore, a defendant-manufacturer
cannot avoid liability as a matter of law if there is evidence that
plaintiff's injury would have occurred even if the modification
had not been made.16 4
For instance, in Tavares v. Hobart Waste Compactor,
Inc.,1 5 defendant manufactured a waste compactor equipped
with a retractable discharge chute intended to block the user
from inserting his hand into the'machine.1 66 Additionally, an in-
terlock switch prevented the compactor from being activated in
the event the chute was raised. 167 Plaintiff was injured when his
left forearm and hand were caught inside the compactor's metal
156. 145 A.D.2d 808, 535 N.Y.S.2d 791 (3d Dep't 1988).
157. Id. at 809-10, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 792.
158. Id. at 810, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 792.
159. 154 A.D.2d 899, 546 N.Y.S.2d 54 (4th Dep't 1989).
160. Id. at 899, 546 N.Y.S.2d at 55.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. McGavin v. Herrick & Cowell Co., 118 A.D.2d 982, 983, 500 N.Y.S.2d 85, 86 (3d
Dep't 1986).
164. Id., 500 N.Y.S.2d at 86-87.
165. 151 A.D.2d 251, 542 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1st Dep't 1989).
166. Id. at 252, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 171.
167. Id.
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paddle." 8 A third party altered the compactor's safety device by
removing and bypassing the interlock.169 Nevertheless, defend-
ant-manufacturer's motion for summary judgment was denied
because evidence showed "that it was technically feasible ... to
design and manufacture a compactor that could not be activated
even if the safety interlock malfunctioned or in any way became
inoperable.' 0 Therefore, the court found that the machine
might have been defective when sold. M Because the original de-
sign of the product may have been defective, the subsequent
modification did not render an otherwise safe product unreason-
ably dangerous.1
Similarly, in Breidenstein v. Zurn Industries,'7 ' defendant-
manufacturer could not avoid liability as a matter of law when
plaintiff's hand was caught in the pinch point of a roll machine
designed to mill plastic materials through two heated rolls.' 74 Al-
though a third party subsequently modified the machine by re-
moving a safety device, the court found that evidence estab-
lished that the device was an insufficient safeguard, and that
more effective safety designs were available when the machine
was built.1 5 In denying defendant-manufacturer's motion for
summary judgment, the court explained that defendant failed to
establish that the accident would have been prevented had the
safeguard not been removed. 7 6
A defendant-manufacturer may avoid liability by proving
that plaintiff's injury was not caused by the product's design. In
Silverstein v. Walsh Press & Die Co.,'" defendant-manufacturer
was not liable when a third party radically restructured a punch
press after it left the manufacturer's hands. Although the court
could not find the precise cause of plaintiff's injuries, it was sat-
isfied that the injuries "were not proximately caused by any de-
sign defect, product malfunction, failure or negligence on the
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. 155 A.D.2d 876, 547 N.Y.S.2d 484 (4th Dep't 1989).
174. Id. at 876-77, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 484-85.
175. Id. at 877, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
176. Id.
177. 119 A.D.2d 658, 501 N.Y.S.2d 97 (2d Dep't 1986).
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part of the defendants. 17 8
IV. Intended Use and Reasonably Foreseeable Use
If a fact-finder determines that a product was not subse-
quently modified, then the product as it existed at the time of
the accident is considered to be manufactured in accordance
with the specified design. Unlike subsequent modification, which
involves an actual change in the composition and form of the
product itself, product misuse involves the usage of the product
in its condition as designed and sold.17 9 In New York, this dis-
tinction is crucial because "it determines whether an injured
plaintiff may or may not recover upon proof of foreseeability."'18
Therefore, to avoid liability under the product misuse theory, a
defendant-manufacturer must prove that the plaintiff used the
product in a manner not intended, and not reasonably
foreseeable.
In Codling v. Paglia,5 1 the New York Court of Appeals held
that in order for a manufacturer of a defective product to be
held liable for damages, the defect must have been a substantial
factor causing the injury, and the product must have been used
"for the purpose and in the manner normally intended .... "181
This rationale has been extended so that a manufacturer may be
liable for injuries arising out of its product's intended or reason-
ably foreseeable use. As stated by the New York Court of Ap-
peals in Micallef v. Miehle Co.:1183
[A] manufacturer is obligated to exercise that degree of care in
his plan or design so as to avoid any unreasonable risk of harm to
anyone who is likely to be exposed to the danger when the prod-
uct is used in the manner for which the product was intended, as
178. Id. at 659-60, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 98. See also Coska v. E.W. Bliss, 168 A.D.2d 664,
563 N.Y.S.2d 492 (2d Dep't 1990) (precise cause of plaintiff's injury while using a punch
press not known, but plaintiff failed to prove that it was due to a design defect).
179. Gallub, supra note 5, at 403 (citations omitted). But see Amatulli v. Delhi Con-
str. Corp., 77 N.Y.2d 525, 571 N.E.2d 645, 569 N.Y.S.2d 337 (above-ground swimming
pool was subsequently modified when it was installed in-ground, despite the fact that the
pool itself was not physically altered).
180. Amatulli v. Delhi Constr. Corp., 77 N.Y.2d 525, 536, 571 N.E.2d 645, 651, 569
N.Y.S.2d 337, 343 (Titone, J., dissenting).
181. 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973).
182. Id. at 342, 298 N.E.2d at 628, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 470.
183. 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1975).
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well as an unintended yet reasonably foreseeable use.184
Therefore, the fact that a manufacturer proves that a plaintiff
misused its product is only the initial step for its defense. The
manufacturer must then prove that the misuse was
unforeseeable.
Micallef also implied that with New York's impending
adoption of comparative negligence, a plaintiff's misuse may
only lessen his recovery and not preclude it. 85 Indeed, after New
York's enactment of comparative negligence 86 it was held that
once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case alleging a defec-
tive product, misuse will not necessarily bar recovery, but will
bear on the issues of intervening cause and apportionment of
fault. s' 8  Therefore, in order for misuse to constitute a complete
defense, it is crucial that the product reached the user in a safe
condition and that the product was misused in an unforeseeable
manner. 8 Alternatively, if the product reached the user in a de-
fective condition, the defendant-manufacturer must show that
the unforeseeable misuse of the defective product was the sole
cause of the plaintiff's injury. 89
As evidenced by Micallef "[a]lthough a manufacturer may
expect that ordinarily its products will be used properly, in the
manner and for the purpose intended, it must also take into ac-
count that sometimes other product uses will be encoun-
tered."' 90 This expansion has borne especially true for automo-
184. Id. at 385-86, 348 N.E.2d at 577, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 121 (citations omitted).
185. Id. at 387, 348 N.E.2d at 578, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 122.
186. On September 1, 1975, New York enacted its comparative negligence statute,
which states:
In any action to recover damages for personal injury .... the culpable conduct
attributable to the claimant. . . , including contributory negligence or assumption
of risk, shall not bar recovery, but the amount of damages otherwise recoverable
shall be diminished in the proportion which the culpable conduct attributable to
the claimant ... bears to the culpable conduct which caused the damages.
N.Y. Ctv. PRAc. L. & R. 1411 (1976).
187. Sheppard v. Charles A. Smith Well Drilling & Water Sys., 93 A.D.2d 474, 478,
463 N.Y.S.2d 546, 548-49 (3d Dep't 1983); see also Craft v. Mid Island Dep't Stores, 112
A.D.2d 969, 971-72, 492 N.Y.S.2d 780, 783 (2d Dep't 1985).
188. Sheppard, 93 A.D.2d at 477-78, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 548.
189. Id.
190. MICHAEL WEINBERGER, NEW YORK LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 23:08 (1990)
(hereinafter "N.Y. LAW OF PRODS. LIAB.").
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bile manufacturers, 191 explosives manufacturers, e' and manu-
facturers of potentially volatile products.'
When the plaintiff's use of the product is in issue, the test
of a defendant's liability is "whether the risks reasonably to be
foreseen would arise from a misuse reasonably to be foreseen. "194
This test of foreseeability relates only to the general type of risk
involving the loss, not the probability of the happening of the
exact chain of events leading to the loss."'5
The case of Tucci v. Bossert' 6 is illustrative. In Tucci, a can
of Drano, a product designed and sold for the purpose of unclog-
ging drains, was bought by a consumer. 9 7 Properly used, only
one tablespoon of Drano should be followed by one cup of water.
After using only a portion of the can the purchaser discarded the
can in a trash bag in front of his house. Subsequently, the in-
fant-plaintiff removed the can from the trash bag and poured
water into the can, whereupon it exploded. 9 '
Defendant-manufacturer urged dismissal of the suit because
it was not reasonably foreseeable that an infant would go
through the garbage, retrieve the can, and pour water into it. 99
The court, however, denied defendant's motion because it was
reasonably foreseeable that an explosion would occur if Drano
was improperly mixed with water.20 0 The court explained that
the issue was whether it was reasonably foreseeable that when
Drano was mixed with water it became dangerous, not whether
the actual chain of events leading up to the accident was
191. See, e.g., Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d
644 (1973) (manufacturer of motor vehicle is liable for injuries to its driver when the
vehicle is involved in an accident [an unintended use] if the design of the vehicle en-
hanced the plaintiff's injuries).
192. See, e.g., Hall v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y.
1972) (manufacturer of blasting caps is liable for injuries to children who played with
them even though the caps were intended for use by professional construction workers).
193. See, e.g., Tucci v. Bossert, 53 A.D.2d 291, 385 N.Y.S.2d 328 (2d Dep't 1976)
(manufacturer of drain-clog remover is liable when an infant filled the discarded can
with water and the can exploded).
194. Id. at 293, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 330.
195. Id., 385 N.Y.S.2d at 330-31.
196. 53 A.D.2d 291, 385 N.Y.S.2d 328 (2d Dep't 1976).
197. Id. at 292, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 330.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 294, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 331.
200. Id.
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foreseeable.2 1
Generally, it is within the jury's province to determine
202owhether the plaintiff's conduct constitutes misuse. It is also
typically within the jury's domain to decide whether the plain-
tiff's use of the product was reasonably foreseeable by the manu-
facturer, 03 and whether the plaintiff's misuse of the product was
the proximate cause of his injuries.0 4
V. Conclusion
Products may be altered in many ways subsequent to manu-
facture. To avoid liability, a defendant-manufacturer must suc-
cessfully demonstrate that the alteration was not within the
product's design, and was therefore subsequently modified. Fur-
thermore, a defendant-manufacturer must prove that the modi-
fication proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. However, even
if the defendant-manufacturer fails to prove that the product
was subsequently modified, it may be able to avoid liability by
showing that the plaintiff used the product in a manner that was
not intended, and not reasonably foreseeable.
New York products liability law does not place a manufac-
turer "in the role of an insurer answerable for all injuries which
may arise from the use or misuse of its product. ' 20 5 The well-
founded pressure on manufacturers to design safe products
should apply equally to purchasers to refrain from altering safe
products. 06 The concepts of subsequent modification and prod-
uct misuse enable manufacturers to avoid liability for certain ac-
201. Id.
202. See, e.g., Singer v. Walker, 39 A.D.2d 90, 93-94, 331 N.Y.S.2d 823, 827 (1st
Dep't 1972), aff'd, 32 N.Y.2d 786, 298 N.E.2d 681, 345 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1973); N.Y. LAW OF
PRODS. LIAB. at § 23:02.
203. Barry v. Manglass, 77 A.D.2d 887, 890, 431 N.Y.S.2d 89, 92 (2d Dep't 1980),
afl'd, 55 N.Y.2d 803, 432 N.E.2d 125, 447 N.Y.S.2d 423 (1981); Tucci v. Bossert, 53
A.D.2d 291, 294, 385 N.Y.S.2d 328, 331 (2d Dep't 1976).
204. Craft v. Mid Island Dep't Stores, Inc., 112 A.D.2d 969, 971, 492 N.Y.S.2d 780,
783 (2d Dep't 1985); Barry v. Manglass, 77 A.D.2d 887, 890, 431 N.Y.S.2d 89, 92 (2d
Dep't 1980), aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 803, 432 N.E.2d 125, 447 N.Y.S.2d 423 (1981); Tucci v.
Bossert, 53 A.D.2d 291, 294, 385 N.Y.S.2d 328, 331 (2d Dep't 1976).
205. Lugo v. LJN Toys, Ltd, 146 A.D.2d 168, 175, 539 N.Y.S.2d 922, 927 (lst Dep't
1989) (Sullivan, J., dissenting), aff'd on other grounds, 75 N.Y.2d 850, 552 N.E.2d 162,
552 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1990).
206. David J. McAllister, Note, Product Modification: The Effect of Foreseeability,
42 U. Prrr. L. REv. 431, 453 (1981).
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cidents related to their products.
A major concern with narrowing a manufacturer's liability
for its products is that it limits the injured worker's remedy to
whatever he receives under Worker's Compensation statutes.
0 7
However, "the absence of a tort remedy against the employer
should not of itself give rise to a third-party remedy against a
manufacturer ... who merely furnished the product to the em-
ployer."20 Although a goal of products liability is to spread the
cost of product injuries to the party that may best afford it,20 9 a
manufacturer should not be liable for injuries that it does not
cause.
Gerald A. Stein*
207. MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT (1979), § 112[D], analysis.
208. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 43:1 (3d ed. 1987) (citing MODEL
UNIFORM PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT (1979), § 112[D], analysis); see also Robinson 49
N.Y.2d at 481, 403 N.E.2d at 444, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 722 ("[T]hat an employee may have
no remedy in tort against his employer gives the courts no license to thrust upon a third-
party manufacturer a duty to insure that its product will not be abused or that its safety
features will be callously altered by a purchaser.").
209. Sage v. Fairchild-Swearingen Corp., 70 N.Y.2d 579, 585, 517 N.E.2d 1304, 1307,
523 N.Y.S.2d 418, 421 (1987); cf. Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 102, 109,
450 N.E.2d 204, 209, 463 N.Y.S.2d 398, 403 (1983); Ebanks v. New York City Transit
Auth., 118 A.D.2d 363, 372, 504 N.Y.S.2d 640, 645-46 (1st Dep't 1986) (Asch, J., dissent-
ing), rev'd, 70 N.Y.2d 621, 512 N.E.2d 297, 518 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1987).
* This Comment is dedicated to my mother, for all her support in all I have done all
my life. The author thanks Professor M. Stuart Madden for his extreme generosity with
both his expertise and his time. The author also gratefully acknowledges the editorial
assistance of Brian Coffey, Anita Matthews, and Aine M. Santry.
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